

1. The value of theories are their ability to explain and predict phenomena in a relatively wide variety of situations. Theories work by logically drawing inferences about phenomena from assumptions that are believed to be accurate. Faulty assumptions and limited applicability, or incompleteness, diminishes the usefulness, or importance, of a theory.

Realism, Neoliberalism and Reflectivism

Realism assumes that states exist in an anarchic relationship with each other because there is no higher authority to prescribe and enforce rules governing state conduct. Without a Hobbesian "Leviathan" to balance competing interests, individual state goals will often bring states into conflict with each other. Neoliberalism also describes the international system as anarchic but considers it an ordered anarchy because the observed relations among states exhibit numerous instances of the use of cooperation rather than conflict in resolving competing state goals. For example, European states have decided to cooperate in the areas of international trade and welfare by establishing an international institution, the European Union, to prescribe and enforces relevant rules. Reflectivists assume that states evolve into a community with commonly shared norms and aspirations that causes states to avoid conflict in furthering state goals.

Since there is no authority higher than the state, realism believes the only important actors in the international arena are states. Neoliberalism concurs that states are important actors because they possess a monopoly on military power, but other important actors also exist. Over the past 30 years, the rapid growth of transnational economic transactions has given rise to international regimes (rules governing relations among states in a particular area) such as GATT and ASEAN in an effort to facilitate the free flow of goods and finance capital across state borders. Multinational corporations, such as Exxon, that have higher sales per year than the GDP of most states exercise considerable economic power. Wealthy multinationals impact the economy of their home country by transporting jobs overseas to host countries or repatriating overseas' profits. Host countries may be impacted by the creation of jobs, in-flow of investment capital, transfer of technology or the export of profits and raw materials out of the country. Realists recognize the impact of international regimes and multinational

corporations but assert that were the interest of these institutions to significantly conflict with the state's interest, the state would control the institutions activities. Reflectivists assume ideas play the key role in international politics because ideas determine the decision maker's material values; that is, the material reality the decision maker is pursuing.

According to realists, the aim of the state is survival, which it achieves by promoting its perceived national interests in order to not only avoid control by another state but to increase its influence over other states in the international system. The only means for assuring survival is self-help. The state must look to its own resources and abilities to protect itself and promote its interests. Neoliberals also consider the furthering of national security interests to be a primary motive of states but would temper the competitive and conflict producing drive of the state for security with cooperation. For instance, a state can enter into alliances with other states that agree to provide military assistance for any member of the alliance rather than engage in an unilateral military buildup that could fuel an arms race. Realists would argue that an agreement without a supranational entity to enforce the agreement or punish states that breach it provides very little assurance of security. One state may switch its alliance to a threatening state or refuse to provide assistance when needed. Some realists view alliances as useful but with the caveat: a state should be able to rely on itself if the alliance fails. Neoliberals would counter that security alliances like NATO have worked in deterring aggression.. Furthermore, even absent a security agreement, states with social, economic and historic ties and mutual interests have provided security for each other. For example, the United States' protection of Japan following World War II and the United States' aid to England under the lend-lease program in 1940. Reflectivists and some neoliberals call for the use of collective security systems to assure security rather than self-help and alliances that maintain a balance in the distribution of political and military power. Under collective security, a threat to any member is considered a threat to all members, who are obligated to respond. (Collective security differs from alliances where the agreements usually involve only a few states and have specific conditions that must be met before the agreements become binding.) Realists criticize collective security systems as embroiling states in conflicts that will not further a state's interest and as unworkable because states cannot be bound to

collective security agreements and are unlikely to aid another nation unless their interests are threatened. For example, the League of Nations failed to follow its collective security purpose by organizing a defense for Ethiopia and Manchuria when they were attacked. In response, reflectivists refer to the United Nations, which provides some degree of collective security through its peace keeping operations, but generally, reflectivists can only look to failed attempts (such as the United States willingness to provide military assets for a U.N. standby force in 1946) and postulate that increased interdependence among states and the sharing of common values will lead to an effective collective security system.

The anarchic, self-help international structure requires a nation to have power in order to survive free of the controlling influence of other states. The realist road to power lies through internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one). (Waltz 1979). Economic power becomes a means to military power under realism. Neoliberals hold that military power is not the only and perhaps not even the dominant force in international relations today. The industrial democracies of North America and Europe have extensive relationships but military power as an instrument of foreign policy with respect to each other is insignificant. The battlefield of the 21st century is shaping up to be economic rather than military, according to Neoliberals and the state with the greatest economic power will be able to prevail over other states. The most militarily powerful state in the history of the world, America, is now threatened with becoming a lesser economic power behind the European Union and Japan, in part, due to America's extensive military spending in 1980's. Realists consider the military spending of the 1980's as crucial in defeating the Soviet Union by forcing it to bankrupt itself on armaments. The realists, however, are now in a bind in that it appears America cannot maintain its military preeminence and economic leadership. Neoliberals and reflectivists criticized the realists' assumption that the means to security is through arms by noting that a state which arms solely for defense may be seen by other states as arming for offense; thereby increasing fear and the chance of a preemptive attack by other states. A spiraling arms race may result in which each state achieves less security because other states

view it more suspiciously. Neoliberals would opt for arms control treaties to limit the cycle of fear that leads to ever increasing armaments and decreasing security. Reflectivists believe states' aspirations for lasting peace will change their behavior to make world disarmament possible. They believe the only truly secure world will be one without arms. However, a disarmed world will probably not provide greater security so long as there exists an aggressive state.

Realism's limitations prevented the theory from explaining the emergence of cooperative institutions in Europe following World War II, determining which policies out of a vast array best serve a state's interest, explaining whether powerful states are more likely to act aggressively, predicting the end of the cold war, accounting for the transformation of the international system to one apparently more concerned with ethical values and dealing with international problems that include environmental damage, global warming, ethnic conflicts and disease epidemics. Despite such drawbacks, realism provides a relatively simple and quick method of decision making for executives and a basis of generalities on which to build with other theories that reach phenomena realism does not. Realism explained the preoccupation with military power, the cold war arms race, imperialism and the struggle for hegemony after World War II until the end of the Soviet Union. But the international system's current emphasis on interdependence requires a theory that focuses on cooperation and economic power.

3. International politics can be analyzed on three levels: individual, domestic or systematic. An individual level analysis looks for determinants of international behavior by focusing on the personal attributes of persons ranging from the ordinary citizen to key decision makers for government and non governmental organizations. The domestic level attempts to explain and predict international activities by analyzing a state's internal characteristics such as the form of government. Systemic analysis looks at activities beyond a state's borders and the relationships among states and non-state organizations to understand international behavior. Systemic analysis deals with alliances among states, world trade, international law and the distribution of political, military and economic power.

Realism advocates a systemic approach called structural determinism. (Waltz, 1979). It assumes that states exist in an anarchic environment without external protection from the hostile actions of other states and that every state's primary objective is to survive; therefore, each state must rely on its own actions for security. The actions a state takes will be determined by its effort to maintain its sovereignty in an almost free-for-all environment. Those actions are constrained and determined by the structure of the international system in which states exist because it is that system states must react to in order to survive. Since foreign policy making entails a state's maneuvering to preserve its independence in an anarchical world, any foreign policy decision will be largely independent of domestic characteristics; therefore, to explain and predict a state's foreign policy only requires an understanding of its position in the world order and not its internal attributes. Each state can be viewed as a unitary actor without internal features and occupying a position in the hierarchy of political, military and to a lesser extent economic power. The unitary actor model, however, fails to account for the fact that individuals make foreign policy decisions. While a systemic structure may push decision makers in a particular direction, their values, beliefs and psychology will also have an impact. Furthermore, the unitary view does not account for the different players involved in the foreign decision making process within a state and how they are influenced by other groups within the state.

A second major tenet of realism's structural determinism is that states reach their foreign policy decisions through a rational process. The decision making process includes recognizing and defining the international problem, which requires an extensive search for all available facts; deciding on a desired goal, which requires an ordering of values to be achieved; listing all feasible policy options and their costs; and choosing the policy with the greatest likelihood of achieving the state's goals. The rational model of policy making fails to account for the reality that available information on an international problem is often incomplete and inaccurate, selection of an end may be influenced by organizational interests within the state, competing options may receive only cursory attention and the policy chosen may result from compromise rather than objective decision making. Additional flaws with realism's structural determinism is its inability to determine the means states use to achieve their ends. For instance, states may build up their military, enter into alliances or refrain from action while

another state with similar interests acts. Most international problems do not involve extreme situations so the emphasis on such situations is misplaced. When a state's survival is not threatened, structural determinism cannot predict whether the international system of rewards and punishment will have greater weight than domestic arrangements of rewards and punishment. (Skidmore and Hudson). By creating a false belief that state actions are preordained, structural determinism creates a self-fulfilling prophecy where decision makers believe they cannot change the international environment, so they fail to try. Finally, the behavior of non-superpower states is not explained by structural determinism.

A number of theories try to correct the failings of structural determinism by using a domestic level considerations. The two-level game theory of international negotiations assumes that foreign policy decision makers seek and maintain domestic political power by constructing coalitions with domestic groups. At the same time, decision makers seek international agreements and relations that advance their state's national interests. (Putnam). The interest of a domestic coalition may not always coincide with national interests. For example, prior to the depression of the 1930's, the industrialized countries, prodded by their local manufacturers, erected barriers to imports, which reduced the competition for local manufacturers, and devalued their currencies, which increased the exports of local manufacturers. The spiral of tariff barriers and devaluations drastically reduced world commerce and contributed to the worldwide economic downturn. Rational policy makers pursuing their states' interests would have concluded agreements, similar to those reached after World War II, to check the decline in worldwide commerce. They did not because, in part, their political power base included local manufacturers. As a result of conflicts of interest between domestic groups and the state, the international agreements that policy makers enter into are limited by domestic considerations. Many states require ratification of international agreements by elected legislators who are subject to lobbying pressures. Intense lobbying by unions threatened NAFTA. Agreements that do not require ratification by elected officials may still lead powerful groups to oppose an agreement by defeating the policy maker in the next elections.

Policy decisions require advice, information and execution. Policy makers rely on organizations, bureaucracies, to provide all three. In theory, bureaucracies increase efficiency through

specialization, avoidance of duplication and consistent rules of procedure. In reality, the theory that bureaucracies provide a rational and effective means of reaching and executing foreign policy does not hold up. Bureaucracies limit the range of policy alternatives because their preset rules of procedure limit their actions. In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Navy's procedure for blockades was to stop incoming ships at a certain number of miles from their destination. Kennedy wanted the blockade of Cuba closer to the Cuban ports to give the Russians more time to decide. The Navy ignored Kennedy's order. Members of the same bureaucracy develop a common perspective of the world and such conformity discourages innovative and imaginative thinking. Bureaucrats often develop a loyalty to their organization that causes them to color information to reflect favorably on it and provide policy suggestions that further their organization's power. The bureaucratic approach is not useful in predicting foreign policy decisions because it is too context specific to provide predictive rules. As a tool for understanding the foreign policy decision making process, however, the bureaucracy model provides valuable insights, especially into the ubiquitous nature of bureaucrats in fighting as a determinate of policy.

Another domestic level approach argues that the form of government determines foreign policy. In a democracy, policy makers are more directly accountable to the will of the people, who will have to pay the price of any foreign misadventure. Independent institutions that include the electoral process, legislature, courts, lobbying and the media provide mechanisms for influencing officials foreign policy decisions. During the Vietnam War, civil disobedience, and the media ended the political career of Lyndon Johnson and pressured Richard Nixon to withdraw American troops. Vietnam War opposition reflected the pluralist theory where groups as diverse as Students for a Democratic Society, Black Panthers, Young Lords, unions, hippies, migrant workers and middle class Americans coalesced around a single issue. Effective pluralistic movements, however, do not often occur, which limits the usefulness of the pluralism hypothesis. The more widely applicable societal bloc theory assumes that substantial domestic political power is controlled by a relatively few stable and enduring societal blocs that have narrow, self-serving interests. In a clash between a societal bloc's interest and the nation's interest, policy makers may give extensive weight to a powerful societal bloc's position. For example,

the American auto industry succeeded in reducing the import of less expensive Japanese cars. Consumers were harmed by having to buy American cars at higher prices solely because they lacked the impact of an elite societal bloc. Consumers could not overcome the difficulty of organizing large numbers of persons with a small stake in the issue.

Neomercantilism theory provides a domestic explanation for foreign trade policies. Economic theory holds that unrestricted world trade will enable each nation to specialize in the products and services it provides most efficiently. The net result would be an efficient allocation of the world's resources. Some states, such as Japan, however, have chosen to erect trade barriers that create trade surpluses for themselves. The increase in exports over imports benefits Japan's domestic welfare at the expense of the domestic welfare of its trading partners.

Structural determinism fails to provide explanations or predictions of the influence of ethnic groups. Realism assumes an individual's primary allegiance rests with the state, which misses the fact that many persons identify first with an ethnic group. Ethnic groups are important international actors because they can reduce a state's cohesion and ability to act rationally. Since vast numbers of ethnic groups challenge a state's authority, and any one ethnic group includes many diverse persons with varying interests, formulating a coherent ethnic theory of foreign policy has not yet occurred..

Structural determinism provides a useful approach to understanding foreign policy decisions because the assumptions of the state as a rational-unitary actor permits generalizations about states' behavior in similar situations. The external environment generally sets the base line of expectations since only rarely can the impact of the international system be ignored. Structural determinism, however, cannot explain or predict every policy decision of a state. It needs to be supplemented with domestic level approaches in the realm of explaining state actions. Domestic analysis' value is presently restricted, however, to explaining state action rather than predicting because a comprehensive theory of domestic politics has not been developed.

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7/3/95 Midnite

That time has past.
Whether I was hit or not.
The hope ~~of~~ ^{of} the future
Has turned sour with age.
I mourn the lost,
Wishing it would be the last.

5/95 For a girl, sex is a means; for a man, an end

5/95 Young girl view their sexuality as capital to be invested for the highest return.

6/11/95 People appear out of nowhere, do some thing or nothing with their lives, then disappear back to nowhere

1/3/96

Life is meant for the few
With the courage to pursue
Their joy.

1/6/96

Lack of courage to take on increasing responsibilities
Because lack confidence to succeed and
Fear social opprobrium for failure...
So withdraw.

3/2

All that man has wrought
Has come from thought

Man is conscious that he is conscious.
And so he is aware that his consciousness
Apparently will end, and there's the rub.

4/12

Individual man really only has one problem:
the awareness that he is going to die.
And ever since that awareness dawned
on him, he has been fighting tooth
and nail to convince himself ^{that it's} just
ain't so.

4/13

I never wanted to live long, but I wanted
to stay young as long as I could.

4/17

Isn't preferable that your work have an impact
on your time or is it preferable that your
work last through time.

7/19/96

Mirror Mirror on the door

You've seen me standing here before
Can you take me back to days ~~before~~ before of yore
So I can be a youth once more

5/14/97

All girls believe they are princesses
And as princess they can act in an
arbitrary manner with total disregard
for reason, logic and fairness.
They also realize that if they acted logically
they would not get what they want.

5/22/97

Most people, most of the time, are malevolent
low-lives or idiots

6/3/97

"I do love being surrounded by girls -
so very different from men"
Captain Aubrey in "Post Captain"

6/13/97

Gays think everybody else is gay. It's a
defensive mechanism to make them think
they are at the pre front of evolution when
in fact they are at the tail end.

7/2/97

I am fenced in with fear
And dare not move
No matter how dear
to me my desire (maybe)

Personal Unconscious: That twisted land
of flint like edges carving hope into
the folder of hopelessness

2/6/97

The energy from the beginning of the
universe that compresses me cartilage
to create a structure that generates
my consciousness

4/99 If you let your fear of failure keep you from trying, then you failed

6/7/99 You don't talk about your feelings
You express them

You don't negotiate a relationship
You seduce

4/1/00 There is no greater fear than an indignant woman
- Nietzsche

"But it is hard to stay mad when there is so much beauty in the world. It fills my heart like a balloon until I think it will burst and then I remember to relax and not try to hold on to it. And then it flows thru me like rain and I feel gratitude for every moment of my stupid, little life." In Beauty

5/2/00 You don't have to save the world
Only yourself.

11/99

Russian island without Romance, without love
Relationship are no more than mutually beneficial
cooperation

Each party in a relationship is ^{so} busy hiding
secrets from each other that the relationship
is unable to progress to higher levels
of intimacy.

The first level, physical they are able to be
intimate with each other but generally
not totally. It varies with couples

The second level, emotional, they are generally
able to reach only a 'level of companionship'
- nothing deeper

The third level, ^{intellectual} psychological has very little
intimacy because each party is
always hiding something from the other

The fourth level, metaphysical union,
which is 'greater than the sum of the
preceding three' is never or almost
never reached because intimacy at
the other three levels is not complete

The lack of deep emotional, psychological and metaphysical
intimacy and accompanying fulfillment of
relationships causes Russians to seek such
elsewhere - in the arts.

"The American habit of parading personal detail startles Russians. Our fascination w/ intimacies suggests an utterly alien way of living at life"

"Everyone has to have something that's secret, that's his own"

"When everything is available, Russians can become incredibly demanding." Nothing but the best will do

Russians do not smile or meet new people

Russians find Am short answers & repartee rude

Russians seek a veiled or subtle way of conveying a thought

For Russians, friends and family come before business

American girls always talk about themselves

Russian women see each other as comrades - in arms against weak men and a hostile world.

casual acquaintance = znakomyi

closer acquaintance = priatel

real friend = drug